John Ikenberry Professor of Politics Date of Birth: 05.10.1954 Country: USA

Content:

1. G. John Ikenberry: Distinguished Scholar and Critic of U.S. Policy
2. Government Service and Fellowships
3. Criticism of U.S. Policy
4. Institutions and International Order
5. World War I Settlement
6. World War II Settlement

G. John Ikenberry: Distinguished Scholar and Critic of U.S. Policy

Education and Career

G. John Ikenberry is a leading scholar of international relations and U.S. foreign policy. He is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. After receiving his BA from Manchester University (Indiana) and his PhD from the University of Chicago in 1985, Ikenberry became an assistant professor at Princeton, where he remained until 1992. He then moved to the University of Pennsylvania, where he taught from 1993 to 1999. He served as Co-Director of the Lauder Institute from 1994 to 1998, and was visiting professor at the Catholic University of Milan, Italy, in 1996. In 2001, he joined Georgetown University, becoming Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice, Peter F. Krogh Chair, in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He returned to Princeton in 2004, recruited by Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter, and was appointed the Albert Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Ikenberry is also a Distinguished Fellow at Konkuk University in Seoul, Korea. In 2013-2014, Ikenberry was the 72nd Eastman Visiting Professor at Balliol College, University of Oxford.

Government Service and Fellowships

Ikenberry served in the State Department's Office of Policy Planning from 1991 to 1992. He was a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from 1992 to 1993, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars from 1998 to 1999, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution from 1997 to 2002. He has also worked on several projects with the Council on Foreign Relations. Ikenberry was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2016.

Criticism of U.S. Policy

Ikenberry is well-known for his sharp critique of what he termed the United States' "neoconservative grand strategy" under the Bush Administration. His criticism is primarily pragmatic: he argues that the U.S. should not eschew imperialism on principle, but rather that it is ill-suited to succeed in an imperial project. He claims that such a strategy, rather than securing a successful war on terror and maintaining international peace, will ultimately alienate U.S. allies, erode international institutions, and provoke a violent, terroristic backlash internationally, as well as becoming politically unsustainable domestically.

Instead, in his article "The Rise of China and the Future of the West" in Foreign Affairs, Ikenberry proposes strengthening and reinvesting in the existing institutions and rules of the U.S.-led Western order. He argues that the first thing the U.S. must do is reestablish itself as the primary supporter of the global economic system that underpins the Western order. From this perspective, as other countries see the U.S. using its power to strengthen existing rules and institutions, U.S. authority will be reinforced because they will be more inclined to work cooperatively with U.S. power. Second, the U.S. should update key postwar security pacts, such as NATO and Washington's East Asian alliances. When the U.S. provides security, U.S. allies will in turn operate within the Western order. Third, the U.S. should renew its support for large-scale multilateral institutions. Economically, possible examples include building on the WTO agreements and completing the current Doha round of trade negotiations designed to expand market opportunities and liberalize trade for developing countries. Fourth, the U.S. should ensure that this order is inclusive, meaning that there should be no room for other rising powers to construct their own "mini-lateral" order. Finally, the U.S. should support efforts to integrate rising developing countries into key global institutions. Less formal organizations, such as the G20 and various other intergovernmental networks, can provide alternative avenues for voice and representation.

Institutions and International Order

In his book After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Ikenberry explores how the United States used its post-World War I and post-World War II hegemony to shape the future of the global order. In both cases, the U.S. attempted to institutionalize its power through the creation of a constitutional order, by which a political order is organized around agreed-upon legal and political institutions that operate to distribute rights and constrain the exercise of power. In doing so, the United States agreed to "tame" its power, placing it within the framework of institutions and the set of rules and rights they entailed. One of the advantages for the United States in doing so was that it secured its position for the long term. In the event its power diminished in the future, the institutional foundation it created would remain intact.

World War I Settlement

After World War I, the balance of power shifted dramatically in favor of the United States. President Woodrow Wilson had the authority to set the conditions of peace and how to construct the postwar order. He sought to do so through a model based on maintaining collective security and fomenting a democratic revolution on the European continent based on American ideals. Britain and France were concerned about America's predominance in power and sought to tie the United States into commitments on the continent. Both sides attempted to find a compromise: the European powers would secure safety and financial considerations, while the United States would institutionalize its power through the League of Nations and maintain a presence on the continent for the foreseeable future. Ultimately, Woodrow Wilson's intended order hit significant obstacles, including the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations. Furthermore, the assigning of war guilt entirely to Germany and the harsh punishments meted out under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles created conditions favorable to Hitler's rise to power.

World War II Settlement

In comparison to the end of World War I, the United States was even more powerful in 1945 after the conclusion of World War II. The nation possessed preponderant military strength and close to half the world's wealth. Once again, the leaders of the United States attempted to use their position of strength to create a stable order that would serve their nation well for decades to come. Political and economic openness were central to this intended structure. It was believed that the closed economic blocs that had existed prior to the war had contributed to the Great Depression and had at least partially precipitated the conflict. Rebuilding a stable Europe was also a priority, as securing American interests was seen as being rooted in European stability. The region also became the battleground for the Cold War, and building up a strong West Germany was seen as a significant step in countering the Soviet Union. In the end, the United States created its desired order through a series of multilateral institutions of security, economics, and finance, including NATO and the Marshall Plan. West Germany was tied to its democratic Western European neighbors through the European Coal and Steel Community (later the European Communities) and to the United States through an Atlantic security pact; Japan was bound to the United States through a military alliance and expanded economic ties. The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 put into place monetary and trading rules that fostered the openness and subsequent flourishing of the global economy. By institutionalizing its power, the United States was willing to act as a "benevolent hegemon," making concessions to weaker states in order to secure their participation in the desired framework.

Ikenberry argues that the dense, extensive, and widely supported network of rules and institutions that are rooted in and reinforced by democracy and capitalism has formed the basis for cooperation and common power over the U.S.-led global system to the present day. He says that the system of institutions built on the rules and norms of nondiscrimination and market openness provides a low barrier to economic participation and high potential returns. The key point, however, is that in order to use these institutions effectively to promote a global power status, a country must work within the order, rather than outside of it. There is thus no way for a major power to modernize without integrating itself into the global capitalist system.

The 2018 special issue of the British Journal of Politics and International Relations was dedicated to After Victory.

Political scientist

Michael McFaul	Fiona Hill	Graham Allison
Leon Weinstein	John Mearsheimer	Samuel Finer