Georg Lindemann German Colonel General, Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves Date of Birth: 08.03.1884 Country: Germany

Biography of Georg Lindemann

Georg Lindemann, a German General Field Marshal and a Knight's Cross recipient with Oak Leaves, was born on March 8, 1884, in Osterburg, Altmark. He joined the army as a cadet in 1903 and was appointed an officer in the 6th Dragoon Regiment in 1904. Lindemann was promoted to Oberleutnant in 1913 and transferred to the 14th Rifle Regiment. During the campaign on Paris in 1914, he served in the 5th Army and received training at the General Staff. At the end of the war, Lindemann served in the 220th Westphalian Infantry Division, which suffered heavy losses at the Battle of the Lys in early 1918. He ended the war decorated with the Iron Cross of both classes and the House Order of Hohenzollern with Swords and continued to serve in the army.

During the Weimar Republic, Lindemann returned to the cavalry. In late 1931, he was promoted to Oberstleutnant and given command of the 13th Cavalry Regiment. In 1933, Lindemann was promoted to Colonel and became the commander of a military academy in Hanover. In 1936, he was assigned to command the 36th Infantry Division in Kaiserslautern and promoted to Major General. In 1938, Lindemann became Lieutenant General. During the "Phoney War" of 1939-1940, he commanded the 36th Infantry Division and led attacks on the Maginot Line. However, he did not have a significant opportunity to distinguish himself. Nevertheless, due to his ambition and sympathy for the Nazi party, Lindemann was awarded the Knight's Cross on August 5, 1940. On October 1, he was appointed commander of L Corps, which was being formed in Baden-Oos. A month later, he was promoted to Cavalry General.

In the spring of 1941, Lindemann's L Corps, along with the 46th, 76th, and 198th Infantry Divisions, was urgently dispatched to the Balkans. However, they arrived too late to participate in the battles in Greece and Yugoslavia. After landing in Romania, the corps headquarters was moved to Bulgaria and then back to Berlin before the start of the invasion of the Soviet Union. In August 1941, it was relocated to Smolensk and then to the Leningrad Front, where the L Corps (together with the 269th Infantry Division and the motorized "police" division) defended the right flank of General Leeb's main attack on the Pulkovo Heights. When Hitler ordered to halt the offensive and deprived Leeb of the opportunity to capture Leningrad, Lindemann's soldiers dug in and remained on the western approaches to the city until the end of 1941. By the beginning of 1944, they were still in their positions.

The fact that Georg Lindemann was appointed commander of the 18th Army when Generaloberst von Küchler replaced Leeb as commander of Army Group North on January 17, 1942, can only be explained by political intrigue, Lindemann's pro-Nazi views, and his willingness to fulfill the Fuhrer's orders. Lindemann had not done anything that could have contributed to his rapid promotion, and there were several other more qualified candidates for the position. The commanders of two out of three corps under the 18th Army (General Albert Vodrich and General Kuno-Hans von Both) were higher in rank than Lindemann. The third, General Moritz von Victorin, had the same rank. Nevertheless, it was the well-known Lindemann, with his pro-Nazi views, who was appointed and played a noticeable role in the Battle of the Volkhov Pocket, where two Soviet armies were encircled and destroyed. After this battle, he was promoted to Generaloberst on July 3, 1942.

In 1942, Lindemann repeatedly thwarted Soviet attempts to break the blockade of Leningrad, but in January 1943, he failed to prevent the creation of a corridor by the Red Army, connecting Leningrad with the "Big Land." Nonetheless, on August 21, 1943, Hitler awarded Lindemann the Knight's Cross. Later, Hitler's favor took more tangible forms. In addition to awards, praise, and verbal encouragement, Lindemann received a check for 200,000 Reichsmarks, sent by Hitler for his "honest and faithful service." One can only speculate about the influence such a "gift" had on Lindemann's future views, but there is no doubt that it was significant.

In late 1943, Generaloberst von Küchler pleaded with Hitler to allow him to lift the blockade of Leningrad and retreat to the "Panther Line" before the Soviet command launched another massive attack against the 18th Army. When Hitler summoned Lindemann, the cavalryman confidently stated that his army was capable of withstanding any Russian assault. Believing exactly what he wanted to hear, Hitler trusted Lindemann and refused to support Küchler's request. On January 4, 1944, foreseeing the impending catastrophe, Field Marshal von Küchler appeared at Lindemann's headquarters and practically begged him to change his decision. However, Lindemann expressed confidence in his ability to hold his positions, even without reserves.

Lindemann's optimism led to disaster. He severely miscalculated, clearly underestimating the strength of the expected Soviet offensive and overestimating the capabilities of his 21 divisions (5 of which were Luftwaffe field divisions). He should have known better. Lindemann lacked reserves, tanks, and self-propelled artillery, and he could hardly count on air support. Furthermore, the length of the front held by his weakened divisions was 25,000 yards, which was twice the permissible norm for successfully repelling an enemy attack. Küchler believed that Lindemann's lack of a sense of reality was driven by a desire to attract Hitler's attention. He succeeded only in that and proved that, under the circumstances, he could not achieve much. The Soviet offensive, with a force ratio of one to six, was launched on January 14. By January 17, the poorly prepared Luftwaffe field divisions were crushed and destroyed. Only the resolute resistance of the SS III Corps under Felix Steiner (including the SS "Police" and "Nordland" divisions, as well as the almost useless 9th and 10th Luftwaffe field divisions) saved the army from complete disaster. Nevertheless, the Waffen-SS units were pushed back and suffered heavy losses. Lindemann's right flank was also threatened by the collapse. The 18th Army was in danger of being encircled from two sides. Despite Küchler ordering a retreat on January 18 (against Hitler's will), by the end of the month, the 18th Army was crushed, losing more than two-thirds of its combat strength. The blame for this lies entirely on Hitler and Lindemann. However, Hitler blamed Küchler and replaced him with Generaloberst Walter Model. It is incredibly astonishing that after Model became the commander of Army Group North Ukraine, Lindemann was appointed as the commander of Army Group North on March 1, 1944. By March 31, the situation in the north had stabilized to some extent. Hitler allowed a retreat to the "Panther Line," and the bad weather (snow, thaw, rain) slowed the Soviet advance. By June, the Army Group North was experiencing a relatively calm period, while Army Group Center, to the south of Lindemann's forces, faced a devastating Soviet offensive. Entire corps and divisions were destroyed. Army Group North was also under attack, although less severely. The almost complete destruction of the Army Group Center exposed Lindemann's right flank. At the end of June, he requested permission to withdraw his exposed southern flank. Generaloberst Kurt Zeitzler, the Chief of the General Staff, not only supported this request but also recommended reducing the front of Army Group North (which could free up additional forces) by leaving Estonia and retreating to the Riga-Daugavpils line. Hitler refused Lindemann's request and instead ordered an attack in the southeast to divert enemy forces from Army Group Center. Lindemann could not accomplish this impossible task, and on July 3, 1944, Hitler relieved him of his command, replacing him with Generaloberst Johannes Friessner.

Lindemann remained out of action for six months but gradually regained Hitler's favor. On January 27, 1945, he was appointed as the commander of the Wehrmacht in Denmark. This command was purely territorial, overseeing several old units, garrisons, and coastal batteries. The fighting spirit of his soldiers left much to be desired. Even after Hitler's death, Lindemann ordered his men not to surrender and to offer any resistance to those who would persuade them to do so, contrary to the policy pursued by Hitler's successor, Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, who told Lindemann that he wanted to end the war with minimal losses. Fortunately, Lindemann's orders were ignored. Realizing that the situation was hopeless and that his soldiers would not obey him, this fanatic surrendered to the British in Copenhagen on May 8, 1945. He was released from captivity in 1947 or 1948 and retired to Freudenshtadt, where he died on September 25, 1963.